fix: allow '..' in filenames without triggering traversal check#1
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lucbrinkman wants to merge 1 commit intoNo-Instructions:mainfrom
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fix: allow '..' in filenames without triggering traversal check#1lucbrinkman wants to merge 1 commit intoNo-Instructions:mainfrom
lucbrinkman wants to merge 1 commit intoNo-Instructions:mainfrom
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The substring check `if ".." in path` was too broad — it rejected filenames containing ellipsis (e.g., "If It's Valuable....md"). Changed to check for ".." as a path component only, which still blocks actual traversal attempts like "../etc/passwd" while allowing dots in filenames. The existing abspath normalization check provides an additional safety net. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
_sanitize_pathsubstring checkif ".." in pathis too broad — it rejects filenames containing ellipsis (e.g.,"If It's Valuable and Can Be Done....md")".."as a path component only (any(part == ".." for part in path.split("/")))../etc/passwdwhile allowing dots in filenamesabspath+startswithnormalization check below provides an additional safety netTest plan
..\\evil.txtto be rejected (on Linux\is a valid filename char, not a path separator)🤖 Generated with Claude Code